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u.s. Policy on Targeting Enemy
Merchant Shipping:
Bridging the Gap Between Conventional
Law and State Practice

I. Introduction

T

hroughout the history ofwarfare it has been clear that the ability ofa nation
at war to obtain logistic support from overseas sources has been a major
factor--sometimes the dominant factor--in its ability to continue the war effort.
Few nations have the economic independence to prosecute a war without
outside resources, or, at least, without the ability to move their implements of
war, provisions, men and material where they are needed. For most nations this
requires an ability to operate their merchant fleets in a hostile maritime
environment.
During the Napoleonic era, both France and England utilized their differing
strengths in an attempt to curtail the other's logistic and commercial capabilities.
In the American Civil War, the blockade of the Confederacy was a principal
component of the Union's war strategy. The indispensable condition for victory
by Japan in its 1905 war with Russia was control of the seas. Without this
advantage, Russia could have resupplied its superior land armies from the sea.
During the progress of both W orId Wars, success of the maritime resupply effort
of the Allied Powers, particularly Great Britain, was the sine qua non of victory.
More recenrly, the conduct of both Iran and Iraq in the Persian/Arabian Gulf
Tanker War confirmed the importance to the warring parties of interdicting
merchant shipping, even for a localized war effort. If it is true that merchant
shipping can be critical to a nation's ability to prosecute a war effort, it is equally
true that the opposing power will seek to interdict that supply effort. Tactics,
weapons systems and geography are variables that will affect any interdiction
effort but the interdiction effort fits nearly with the general principles ofwar. 1
The conundrum of this situation is that while merchant shipping contributes in
a major way to the prosecution of a nation's war effort, traditional law regards
merchant ships as civilian objects and merchant seamen as civilians and thus not
legitimate targets of direct attack.
The experience ofWorId War I demonstrated that a belligerent whose war
effort required it to cut off seaborne logistic support for its enemy would
nevertheless target enemy merchant ships. In an effort to protect civilian
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passengers from the ravages of war, particularly from the threat posed by the
submarine, the London Protocol of 1936 sought to codify a requirement that
subjected submarines to the same rules that were applicable to surface warships
in their actions against enemy merchant ships. As we are all aware, the practices
of the Second W orld War diverged substantially from those laid down in that
Protocol, as did the realities of modem weapons systems, naval platforms and
naval tactics. The result is an apparent gap between putative conventional law
and state practice. The naval targeting policies of the United States, as reflected
in the two naval manuals that have been published by the Navy since World
War II-the LAw of Naval Waifare (NWIP 10-2, 1955) and The Commander's
Handbook on the LAw of Naval Operations (NWP-9, 1987)-have wrestled with
this gap between the putative conventional law and state practice. It is the
purpose of this paper to examine the nature of this apparent gap and appraise
the success of the most recent publication (The Commander's Handbook) in
bridging it.

II. Conventional Law
Traditional international law distinguishes between enemy warships and
enemy merchant ships. Warships are instruments of war and subject to attack
and destruction without warning. Merchant ships, even those sailing under the
flag ofthe enemy, are considered as civilian objects and manned by civilian crews,
and so long as they maintain their proper role, are subject only to seizure as prize
and subsequent condemnation in prize courts of the capturing belligerent. Only
in special circumstances2 is the capturing power allowed to destroy the prize,
and then only after removing the passengers, crew and ship's papers to a place
ofsafety.3
Since the tum of the century, both nations and international law publicists
have been concerned with how to reconcile these principles with the realities
of the means and methods of naval warfare-particularly the submarine, but also
including military aircraft-that have developed since that time. The 1899
Hague Peace Conference wrestled with the issue of submarine warfare but
focused more on the unchivalrous methodology of destruction than on its
target. 4 The cruelties of the commerce war at sea sharpened that focus and no
doubt contributed to the eventual agreement embodied in the 1936 Protocol.
Yet the 1936 Protocol has a broader genesis than submarine warfare, and it is
important to review some of the origins of customary and conventional law
relevant to targeting merchant vessels.
Four Conventions adopted at the Hague in 1907, Convention (VI) Relating
to the Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities,s Convention (VII) Relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into Warships,6
Convention (XI) Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise
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of the Right of Capture in Naval War,7 and Convention (XIII) Concerning the
Rights and Duties of Neutrals in Naval War,s dealt in some manner with the
status of merchant ships, but none in any way modified the traditional law
outlined in the preceding paragraph. The conferees' concern for protecting
merchant ships from attack is no better illustrated than in Hague Convention
VI, which provided for a grace period for merchant ships that might find
themselves in an enemy port at the outbreak of hostilities to exit and make their
way to a friendly port without being subjected to attack. For enemy vessels at
sea but ignorant of the outbreak of hostilities , the Convention allowed destruction in some cases but only against payment of compensation and provision for
the safety of the persons on board and security of the ship's papers.
The London Naval Conference of 1909, which was called by the British
Government for the purpose of codifying the Prize Court rules for the International Prize Court contemplated by Hague XII, produced a "Declaration
Concerning the Laws of Naval Warfare.,,9 Its only provision respecting destruction of merchant vessels is contained in Chapter IV and deals only with the
destruction of neutral merchant ships. It authorized their destruction only as an
exception to the duty of condemnation as prize in cases in which taking the
captured vessel into port "would involve danger to the safety of the warship or
to the success of the operations in which she is engaged at the time.,,10
Following World War I, the 1921-1922 Washington Naval Conference,
under the sponsorship of the United States, and with the participation of Great
Britain, France, Italy and Japan, made a further attempt to codify the customary
law governing attacks on merchant vessels at sea. The resulting draft Treaty,11
in addition to codifying the traditional rule that enemy merchant ships could
not be attacked unless they refused to submit to visit and search, contained an
absolute prohibition on the use of the submarine in a commerce-destroying
mode. Article 4 provided:
The Signatory Powers recognize the practical impossibility of using submarines
as commerce destroyers without violating, as they were violated in the recent war
of 1914-1918, the requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the
protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the end that the
prohibition of the use of submarines as commerce destroyers shall be universally
accepted as a part of the law of nations, they now accept that prohibition as
henceforth binding as between themselves and they invite all other nations to
adhere thereto. 12

This Treaty never entered into force because of the non-ratification by France,
but some commentators seem to view the Treaty as an expression of customary
law.
The same group of powers that had signed the abortive 1922 Washington
Treaty assembled again in London in 1930. At that Conference they signed a
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Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Annaments,13 which contained Article 22 again asserting the applicability to submarines of the traditional
rules prohibiting the sinking of merchant ships without having first placed
passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place ofsafety.14 Although the Treaty
was to expire by its own terms in 1936, this article was to remain in force without
limit of time15 and contained an invitation to all other powers to express their
assent to the rules. When the signatories of the 1930 Treaty reconvened in 1936,
they converted Article 22 into a formal proces-verbal, which we know today as
the London Protocol of1936. 16 In addition to 11 signatories, 37 states, including
all of the belligerents in W orId War II except Romania, had become parties to
the Protocol before the outbreak of hostilities in 1939. The operative part of the
text, in its entirety, reads as follows:
Rules
(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to
the rules of international law to which surface vessels are subject.
(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly
summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface
vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant
vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of
safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless
the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather
conditions, by the proximity ofland, or the presence of another vessel which is
in a position to take them on board.

Is the 1936 Protocol still alive? In 1971 and 1973 Tonga and Fiji respectively
filed documents of continuity for the Protocol, but they are the only nations to
have formally become parties to it since January 1939, when Iran became the
last previous accession. It is worth noting that each of the Twentieth Century
attempts to reduce to treaty form the law applicable to destruction of enemy
merchant ships in naval warfare has proceeded from an attempt to codify
customary law. Bearing in mind that other papers in this symposium address
practice in more detail,17 it is nevertheless indispensable to review, at least briefly,
the practices of nations since the Protocol was adopted.

III. State Practice
It is axiomatic that the actual practice of states is a key element in the creation
ofinternational norms. When consistent, long-continued, and acquiesced-in by
other states, and when combined with the element of opinio juris, such practice
may be said to be international law. This is true of the international law of armed
conflict as well as the law of peace. But in trying to draw inferences from state
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practice in the area of the law of anned conflict, it is important to be cautious
not to draw sweeping conclusions from incomplete or ambiguous evidence.
The first post-Protocol test of the rules established by the Protocol occurred
almost immediately in the Spanish Civil War. In that conflict, neutral merchant
ships were sunk without warning. The world's reaction was predictably one of
outrage. The leading European powers (less Italy and Germany, which were
actively supporting the Franco regime) adopted the Nyon Agreement, which
provided that submarines which attacked neutral ships contrary to the rules of
the Protocol should be "counter-attacked and, ifpossible, destroyed.,,18 The
Council of the League of Nations condemned the attacks as "in violation of the
most elementary dictates of humanity underlying the established rules of international law [as set forth in the 1930 London declaration] ... " and declared
"that all attacks of this kind against any merchant vessels are repugnant to the
conscience of the civilized nations which now find expression through the
Council.,,19 Obviously, the parties to the Nyon Agreement and the members
of the Council of the League who voted for the Council resolution considered
the Protocol to express the governing rule oflaw.
The Protocol was put to its severest test in World War II. The practices of
states in this conflict are dealt with in detail in other papers presented at this
symposium20 and will not be discussed extensively herein except as necessary to
serve as a predicate for examining the rules stated in the two post-World War
II manuals published by the U.S. Navy. Suffice it to say that in that War the
surface ships, aircraft and submarines of both Allied and Axis powers attacked
enemy merchant ships (and in some cases neutrals) without warning and without
making any effort (in most cases) to make provisions for the safety of the
passengers, crews, or ships' papers as required by the Protocol. Both sides justified
these practices either on the basis of reprisal (which in itselfis an admission that
absent the first violation by the other side, the practice is illegal under internationallaw) or on assertions that the other side had incorporated its merchant
fleet into the combatant force by mounting offensive weapons on the ships,
convoying them, requiring them to report enemy submarine sightings, and
ordering them to take offensive action against surfaced submarines (e.g., ramming), thus taking away their character as "merchant" ships within the meaning
of the Protocol. These justifications imply that the parties to that conflict
regarded the 1936 Protocol as continuing in effect, although not applicable to
the circumstances then existing.
But the most significant World War II and post-World War II indication of
an international consensus concerning the continuing validity vel non of the
Protocol is found in the Nuremberg Tribunal's judgement in the case ofAdmiral
Doenitz, who was charged with waging unrestricted submarine warfare in
violation of the Protocol. The Tribunal found Doenitz not guilty of conducting
unrestricted submarine warfare against enemy armed merchant ships but guilty
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of sinking neutral ships and of failure to carry out the warning and rescue
provisions of the Protocol. The Tribunal stated its reason for its not guilty finding
as follows:
Shortly after the outbreak of war the British Admiralty . . . anned its merchant
vessels, in many cases convoyed them with anned escort, gave orders to send
position reports upon sighting submarines, thus integrating merchant vessels into
the warning network of naval intelligence. On 1 October 1939, the British
Admiralty announced that British merchant ships had been ordered to ram
U-boats ifpossible.21
Even as to its guilty findings, however, the Tribunal declined to assess sentence
against Admiral Doenitz "on the ground of his breaches of the international law
of submarine warfare" in view of
all of the facts proved and in particular of an order of the British Admiralty
announced on 8 May 1940, according to which all vessels should be sunk at sight
[night?] in the Skagerrak, and the answers to interrogatories by Admiral Nimitz
stating that unrestricted submarine warfare was carried on in the Pacific Ocean by
the United States from the first day that Nation entered the war.22

The latter statement by the Tribunal has been interpreted in differing ways with
respect to whether the 1936 Protocol remains in effect. One of my Navy
colleagues, Alex Kerr, in an article in the Naval Institute Proceedings in 1955 stated,
"the Protocol is no longer law; its provisions are obsolete; it is defunct.,,23 In
1956, in a lecture celebrating the publication of the predecessor to the current
Commander's Handbook, I took a contrary view. I stated:
The Court was merely exercising its power to mitigate the sentence in view of
its interpretation of the extenuating ev,idence produced before it. . . . That the
court condemned the action of the defendant is made absolutely clear by its
findings of guilt. On the other hand, the Court's interpretation of the actions of
the British (and American actions under what the Court supposed were similar
circumstances in the Pacific) were factors which could be considered by the court
in determining a sentence appropriate to the offenses committed by Doenitz.
Viewed in this light, therefore, the failure of the court to sentence Doenitz with
regard to his breaches of the law ofsubmarine warfare does not in any way detract
from the previous findings [of guilty] of the court. 24
Which of these views is correct? Is the humanitarian law of armed conflict
served by continuing statements giving lip service to an aging treaty that remains
on the books but has been almost totally ineffective in bringing about the
practices it was intended to ensure?
We have no contemporary practice of states with respect to submarine
warfare, since submarines have not been used as commerce raiders in any of the
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conflicts since World War II. We do have, however, some suggestions from the
recent Iraq-Iran Tanker War that states will use whatever means they have
available to disrupt an enemy's ocean commerce and will, to a large extent,
ignore the rules laid down in the 1936 Protocol.
Both Iran and Iraq depended on the oil trade for economic sustenance during
the conflict. Both had a strong desire to curtail the other's ability to sell oil and
thus finance the war effort. But the military capabilities and vulnerabilities of the
two warring states were different.
From the outset, Iraq had no surface or subsurface warfare capability but did
have a capable, if small, air force. Iran had a strong surface warfare capability but
a weak air force. Iraq's oil exports were primarily through pipelines, largely
inaccessible to Iranian military targeting. Iran's oil exports were carried by
merchant tankers through the Persian Gulf, but to all intents and purposes they
were immune from any surface threat because Iraq had no viable naval surface
forces.
Iraq, early in the war, commenced an air-interdiction campaign against
tankers of any nationality carrying Iranian oil. Because of the great distances
involved, Iraq used its air force frugally, flying one or two aircraft at a time,
low-level, down the western side of the Gulfbefore turning eastward to attack
merchant tankers plying the oil trade with Iran. At a predetermined point, the
aircraft would come to altitude, acquire radar contact with a "large naval target"
on the Iranian side of Iran's declared exclusion zone and fire missiles. The
distance from base and the lack of supporting surface forces, coupled with the
inability to loiter, made it impossible for Iraq to follow the 1936 Protocol, if,
indeed, the Protocol is applicable to aircraft attacks. In addition, it is arguable
that these attacks were indiscriminate, violating one of the most fundamental of
the humanitarian rules of armed conflict.
Iranian attacks on merchant shipping on the western side of the Gulf were
clearly indiscriminate. Iran frequently attacked merchantmen known to be
carrying cargoes neither destined for nor containing exports from Iraq. It seems
clear that these attacks were not undertaken as a means of attacking Iraqi
merchant vessels, or merchant vessels destined for or leaving Iraq, since there
were no Iraqi vessels operating in the Gulf and all sea access to Iraqi ports had
been totally curtailed, but rather as a means indirectly to coerce the Gulf states
to stop supporting Iraq and through them to pressure Iraq to cease its attacks on
tankers serving Iran.
When diplomatic efforts by a number ofstates failed to stop attacks on neutral
vessels by Iran, some "neutral" states, including the United States, resorted to
escorting their merchant vessels through the Gulf to and from ports in uninvolved Gulf states. The charges and counter-charges between warring and
"neutral" states during this conflict make it difficult, at this early date, to assess
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whether the practices that were followed will have any effect in shaping the law
of targeting of merchant vessels.

IV. Bridging the Gap
A.· The Importance ofManuals
In a paper published in the immediately preceding volume of the Naval War
College Blue Book series, Professor Michael Reisman and William K. Lietzau,
have stated that military manuals and handbooks on international law have two
important functions:
First, they are the indispensable modality for disseminating nonnative information
to those whose behavior is the target of the norms in question. Second, they are
an essential component in the international lawmaking process, often the litmus
test of whether a putative prescriptive exercise has produced effective law.2S

In other words, the Commander's Handbook serves not only as the United States
government's means of telling naval personnel at all levels of command what rules
they will follow in carrying out their military mission but also as a statement of
the United States government's interpretation ofwhat the law is or is becoming.
In his seminal book, Legal Controls if International ConjIid,26 Professor Julius
Stone addressed at length the question of attacks on enemy commerce by
submarines and aircraft. He concludes one section of his analysis with the
following remarks:
The immediate task is to regulate the future ofnaval warfare in which submarines
and aircraft will join in the attack on enemy commerce; for it is regrettably clear
that no rule purporting to exclude them from this role, however well grounded
in humanity, will be brooked. And in any such regulation, the aptness of
submarines, aircraft and mines for destroying enemy commerce, their need for
surprise and secrecy for effective and safe operation, the importance in modern
war of the industrial economy which such destruction undermines, all of these as
well as the claims of neutral commerce to immunity, and the demands of
humanity, are factors for consideration ••.
It is idle to seek to reduce this matter to a cri de coeur of humanity. War law, even
at its most merciful, is no expression of sheer humanity, save as adjusted to the
exigencies of military success, a truth as bitter (but no less true) about attacks on
merchant ships, as about target area saturation bombing. And it is also quite idle
for Powers whose naval supremacy in surface craft enables them to pursue the aim
of annihilating the enemy's seaborne commerce without "sink at sight" warfare,
to expect that States which cannot aspire to such supremacy will refrain from
seeking to annihilate the commerce by such naval means available to them as
submarines, aircraft and mines. To refuse to face this will save neither life nor ship
in any future war; and it will also forestall the growth ofreal rules for the mitigation
of suffering under modern conditions.
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The resort of British and American forces in the Second World War to "sink at
sight" action against merchant ships only underlines the present view. And the
consequent refusal of the International Military Tribunal to visit punishment upon
Admiral Doenitz for breach of the treaty rules as to submarines, earnesdy
challenges the publicists ofall nations to rethink their positions. Only thus can some
part oj the humanity which now enters this sphere on paper only, reenter the field oj war
practice controlled by law. Xl
Does the fonnulation for attacks on merchant vessel, both neutral and enemy,
contained in the Commander's Handbook reflect this rethinking urged by Professor
Stone, or does it merely perpetuate a "paper only" entry of humanity into this
field of warfare?

B. The Predecessor Manual (NWIP 10-2)
Before looking in detail at the provisions of the 1987 Handbook, it might be
appropriate to take a brieflook at the Handbook's 1955 predecessor, The Law of
Naval Waifi:lre (NWIP 10_2).28 This ma,nual's provisions with respect to destruction of enemy merchant vessels prior to capture are contained in one succinct
subsection as follows:
Enemy merchant vessels may be attacked and destroyed, either with or without
prior warning, in any of the following circumstances:
1. Actively resisting visit and search or capture.

2. Refusing to stop upon being duly summoned.
3. Sailing under convoy of enemy warships or enemy military aircraft.
4. If armed, and there is reason to believe that such armament has been
used, or is intended for use, offensively against an enemy.
5. If incorporated into, or assisting in any way, the intelligence system
of an enemy's armed forces.
6. If actin~in any capacity as a naval or military auxiliary to an enemy's
armed forces.
It is to be noted that the stated rules make no distinction as to whether the
attacking unit is a surface warship, military aircraft of submarine. In a note to
this section, it is stated that the rules of the 1936 Protocol are deemed declaratory
of customary international law and "have been interpreted as applicable to
belligerent military aircraft in their action toward enemy merchant vessels. ,,30
In a Naval War College Blue Book written contemporaneously with the
publication of NWIP 10-2, which is essentially an exegesis of NWIP 10-2,
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Professor Robert W. Tucker, the author of both publications, justifies the section
503b(3) fonnulation as follows:
It is believed that this provision does not substantially depart from the requirements
of the traditional law, although it does focus attention upon those recent practices
of belligerents which serve, and have always served, to deprive belligerent
merchant vessels of immunity from attack.31
In further explanation of "those recent practices" which serve to deprive
belligerent merchant vessels of their immunity from attack, Tucker explains that
they were not, as some contended, the arrival of the submarine and aircraft on
the scene, with their effectiveness as commerce raiders and their inability to
follow the traditional rules ofvisit, search and capture, but rather the integration
of merchant vessels into the military effort of the enemy, thus destroying the
assumption upon which the traditional rule was based-i.e., that there was a
clear distinction between enemy merchant vessels and enemy warships?2
In essence then, the 1955 U.S. naval manual affinned the continuing validity
of the 1936 Protocol but adapted its application to the conditions that might
exist in a conflict in which the enemy incorporated its merchant vessels into the
military effort, thus essentially converting them into naval auxiliaries. It did not,
however, allow submarines any special exemptions based on their particular
operational capabilities and limitations or their vulnerabilities when surfaced.

c.

Rules Applicable to Surface Warships
The 1987 manual, The Commander's Handbook, appears to follow a pattern
similar to that ofNWIP 10-2, although with some interesting variations. Instead
of treating all naval platforms in one section, it divides the rules between three
sections, one applicable to surface ships, one to submarines, and one to military
aircraft. The provisions applicable to surface ships are found in paragraph 8.2.2.2,
entided "Destruction," which provide in pertinent part:
Although the rules of the 1936 London ::'=-.:-t.)col continue to apply to surface
warships, they must be interpreted in light of current technology, including
satellite communications, over-the-horizon weapons, and antiship missile systems,
as well as the customary practice of belligerents in World War II. Accordingly,
enemy merchant vessels may be attacked and destroyed by surface warships, either
with or without prior warning, in any of the following circumstances:
1. Actively resisting visit and search or capture

2. Refusing to stop upon being summoned to do so
3. Sailing under convoy of enemy warships or enemy military aircraft
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4. Ifanned
5. If incorporated into or assisting in any way, the intelligence system
of the enemy's anned forces
6. If acting in any capacity as a naval or military auxiliary to an enemy's
anned forces
7. Ifintegrated into the enemy's warfighting/war sustaining effort and
compliance with the rules of the 1936 London Protocol would, under the
circumstances of the specific encounter, subject the surface warship to
imminent danger or would otherwise preclude mission accomplishment.

The first six of these conditions parallel the conditions set forth in NWIP
10-2. The only departure of substance is the omission in condition 4 of the
statement, "and there is reason to believe that such armament has been used, or
is intended for use, offensively against an enemy." The Annotated Supplement to
The Commander's Handbook on the Law oJNaval Operations explains this departure
from the NWIP 10-2 version as follows:
In light of modern weapons it is impossible to determine, if it ever was possible,
whether the annament on merchant ships is to be used offensively against an
enemy or merely defensively. It is unrealistic to expect enemy forces to be able
33
to make that determination.

The seventh condition is new and was added, according to the Annotated
Supplement, to cope with the deficiency in condition six, perceived by Professor
Mallison, that a possible interpretation of this paragraph might prohibit destruction ofan enemy merchant ship carrying cargo ofsubstantial military importance
but is not a "military or naval auxiliary" because it is not owned by or under the
exclusive control of the armed forces. 34
Two comments concerning this statement of the rules applicable to surface
warships are appropriate. The first is that the explanatory part of the paragraph
justifies the departure from the strict rules of the 1936 Protocol in the first place
by advances in technology ("including satellite communications, over-thehorizon weapons, and antiship missile systems") and only secondarily on the
customary practice of belligerents that evolved during and following W orId War
II. This justification was specifically eschewed by Tucker in framing the
exceptions in the 1955 naval manual. The Annotation does not explain this
departure, but it is consistent with Julius Stone's comment, quoted earlier, that
the "aptness ofsubmarines, aircraft and mines for destroying enemy commerce"
is a factor for consideration in framing regulations for the future of naval
warfare.35
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The second comment is that nowhere in the Commander's Handbook is there
a statement as to who has the authority to make the determinations required by
conditions before destruction may take place. On this latter point, the first two
conditions, which are stated in the 1936 Protocol itself, would appear appropriate
for determinations by the on-scene commander, whether he is on the surface,
in the air or in a submarine. Conditions three and four are capable of objective
determination by the on-scene commander in most cases. But conditions five,
six and seven are, and more appropriately should be, for determination at the
policy level of government and implemented by a service-wide directive.
Finally it would appear that the ultimate effect of the formulation of the rules
in paragraph 8.2.2.2 is to apply the London Protocol constraints only in those
circumstances in which the enemy merchant vessel is totally defenseless and its
destruction without warning offers no clear military advantage to the attacker.

D. Rules Applicable to Submarines
The Commander's Handbook treats submarines in paragraph 8.3.1, which states
initially that, "[t]he conventional rules of naval warfare pertaining to submarine
operations against enemy merchant shipping constitute one of the least
developed areas of armed conflict." This statement standing alone is perplexing.
The real question facing those who must implement the rules is whether the
"conventional" law has been so modified by desuetude or the development of
superseding customary law that the "conventional" law has been rendered
defunct.
The initial sentence does not, however, stand alone. The text goes on to
acknowledge that the London Protocol "makes no distinction between submarines and surface warships with respect to the interdiction ofenemy merchant
shipping." It states further that, "[t]he impracticability of imposing upon submarines the same targeting constraints as burden surface warships is reflected in
the practice of belligerents of both sides during World War II when submarines
regularly attacked and destroyed without warning enemy merchant shipping."
It acknowledges, however, that these practices were justified as reprisals or
because the enemy had integrated its merchant marine into its war-fighting/warsustaining effort. Then, stating explicidy that the rules stated are a synthesis of
those contained in the London Protocol of 1936 and "the customary practice
of belligerents during and following World War II," the paragraph states that
submarines must:
provide for the safety of passengers, crew, and ship's papers before destruction of
an enemy merchant vessel unless:

1. The enemy merchant vessel refuses to stop when summoned to do
so or otherwise resists capture.
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2. The enemy merchant vessel is sailing under armed convoy or is itself
armed.
3. The enemy merchant vessel is assisting in any way the enemy's
military intelligence system or is acting in any capacity as a naval auxiliary
to the enemy's armed forces.
4. The enemy has integrated its merchant shipping into its war-fighting/war-sustaining effort and compliance with this rule would, under the
circumstances of the specific encounter, subject the submarine to imminent
danger or would otherwise preclude mission accomplishment.

The Annotated Supplement to this section of the Commander's Handbook states
that, "[t]hese exceptions are identical to those applicable to surface warfare. ,,36
If so, why are they listed separately? The Annotated Supplement does not explain.
In fact, there are minor, but perhaps significant, differences.
The first is in the chapeau to the listing of circumstances authorizing
destruction. In paragraph 8.2.2.2, which is applicable to surface warships, the
chapeau reads in part that "enemy merchant vessels may be attacked and
destroyed by surface warships, either with or without prior warning, in any of
the following circumstances: .... " In paragraph 8.3.1, which is applicable to
submarines, the corresponding language reads as follows: "[the applicable law]
imposes upon submarines the responsibility to provide for the safety of passengers, crew, and ship's papers before destruction ofany enemy merchant vessel
unless: .... " In the case ofsurface ships, unless one of the circumstances applies,
a surface ship may not attack and destroy. In case of submarines, the right to
attack and destroy seems to be assumed, but not without first providing for the
safety of crew, passengers and ship's papers. Further, there is no mention in this
paragraph of what is meant by providing for the safety of crew, passengers and
ship's papers. By referring back to paragraph 8.2.2.2, the commander can find a
reference to the 1936 Protocol and its statement that the ship's lifeboats are
generally not considered a place ofsafety, but the amalgamation in the discussion
part of the two paragraphs of the rules of the 1936 Protocol and the practices of
World War II may leave some doubt in the commander's mind-as it does in
mine-as to whether the Commander's Handbook intends that the constraints
stated in paragraph 8.2.2.2 are equally applicable to submarines.
The second difference between the statement of the rules applicable to
submarines and those for surface warships is the omission of "actively resisting
visit and search" in the listing of circumstances applicable to submarine attacks.
This omission is apparently a tacit admission, not acknowledged in the 1955
Manual (NWIP 10-2), that it is impossible for submarines to carry out the
traditional form of visit and search-a fact obvious to naval planners since the
integration of the submarine into maritime commerce warfare prior to World
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War I but papered over by negotiators who fonnulated the rules developed at
each of the principal naval conferences of 1930 and 1936.37 The Commander's
Handbook thus accepts the fact that visit and search will not be attempted by
submarines. In light of this omission, it is strange that the listing includes refusal
"to stop when summoned to do so or otherwise resists capture." To suggest that
a submarine might risk its safety by surfacing and signalling an enemy merchant
vessel to stop and then to capture it seems just as unlikely as to expect it to carry
out a visit and search. Nevertheless, the removal of any reference to visit and
search in the submarine section seems to bring a greater sense of reality to the
rules.
Whether this greater sense of reality comports with international law remains
unresolved. In the McDougalian frame of reference, it is a "claim" put forth by
the United States "which other decision-makers, external to the [United States
will] weigh and appraise ... and ultimately accept or reject.,,38 The manuals of
other naval powers will provide evidence of whether this" claim" by the United
States has been accepted or rejected, but only the crucible of actual conflict, and
the outcome thereof, will provide the final test.

E. Rules Applicable to Military Aircraft
Just as in the case of submarines, the rules applicable to military aircraft are
fonnulated separately from those applicable to surface warships. Paragraph 8.4
provides in pertinent part:
Enemy merchant vessels . . . may be attacked and destroyed by military aircraft
only under the following circumstances:
1. When refusing to comply with directions from the intercepting
aircraft.

2. When assisting in any way the enemy's military intelligence system
or acting in any capacity as auxiliaries to the enemy's anned forces.
3. When sailing under convoy of enemy warships, escorted by enemy
military aircraft, or anned.

4. When otherwise integrated into the enemy's warfighting or war-sustaining effort.
Neither the text of the Commander's Handbook itself nor the Annotated
Supplement indicates the derivation of the rules made applicable to aircraft attacks
on enemy merchant ships.39 The 1936 Protocol does not apply, and no other
explicit conventional rules exist. Some publicists have suggested that the 1936
Protocol rules are a part of customary international law applicable to aircraft, but
the basis for such a conclusion certainly cannot be found in the practices of
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belligerents in World War II. The authors of the Commander's Handbook seem
to have applied the humanitarian considerations underlying the 1936 Protocol,
as well as the basic principles of humanitarian law concerning the distinctions
between military objectives and civilians, to derive a set of rules similar to those
applicable to surface ships and submarines.
The basic rules are similar, with modifications made necessary by the
limitations inherent in aircraft. The inability to visit and search or to capture is
recognized. For conditions depending on resistance to these actions, the
Commander's Handbook substitutes refusal to comply with directions from the
intercepting aircraft. The rules do not mandate an obligation to provide for the
safety of passengers and crew, this being a practical impossibility, although a
subsequent paragraph does require, "[t]o the extent that military exigencies
permit," that the aircraft search for survivors and report their location to units
that might be capable of rendering assistance.
Of the four conditions which allow for attack by aircraft, the last three are
essentially a restatement of conditions three through six applicable to surface
ships. The reasons for the variation in wording and arrangement are not apparent.
As in the case of attacks by surface ships, whether a particular merchant ship has
been integrated into the enemy's war-fighting or war-sustaining effort is a
question which seems beyond the competence of the on-scene commander and
should be addressed at the national level. Whether the vessel is under convoy,
refuses to comply with the directions of the aircraft, or is armed may be the
subject ofindividual determination at the scene, but the aircraft may subject itself
to substantial risk in determining whether its target is armed before making its
attack.
Just as in the case of surface ships, the conditions stated are conditions
precedent to attack. Unlike the situation with submarines, the right to attack is
not assumed.

V. Assessment
Any oftoday's navies that attempt to prescribe rules for conduct ofsea warfare
against commerce face the same dilemma that faced the authors of The
Commander's Handbook in trying to walk a fine line between the conventional
law as set forth in the 1936 Protocol and the actual practices ofstates that occurred
in World War II and subsequent conflicts. The 1936 Protocol is still on the
books, and has not been renounced nor formally repudiated by any state that is
a party to it. The practices of all parties that took part in World War II bore no
resemblance to those required by the Protocol. But these practices were justified
not by repudiation of the Protocol but rather by justifications that purportedly
rendered it inapplicable to the particular circumstances under which the conflict
was carried out. The rationale for the Nuremberg Tribunal's acquittal ofAdmiral
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Doenitz of the charge ofunrestricted submarine warfare against enemy merchant
fleets gives further credibility to the claim that the 1936 Protocol was not defunct
but was merely inapplicable.
The Commander's Handbook seems to accept the continued viability of the
Protocol but assumes that,just as in World War II, the practices ofstates in future
conflicts will be such as to make it inapplicable in most circumstances. Recent
practice in those few instances of post-World War II conflicts in which the
warring states carried on commerce warfare would seem to justifY that conclusion.
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